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RULE 23-DON QUIXOTE HAS A FIELD DAY:
SOME ETHICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
MAURICE R. FRANKS*
T HE 1966 AMENDMENTS to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23
have yielded a veritable rash of stockholder litigation. The new
procedural simplicity has opened the floodgates to unrestrained,
widespread and lucrative exploitation of the class action device by
members of the trial bar.'
* Maurice R. Franks, a member of the Tennessee, Louisiana, and Federal bars, re-
ceived his Bachelor of Science and Juris Doctor degrees from Memphis State University.
Presently, he is working on his LL.M. at the School of Law of the Tulane University of
Louisiana.
1 Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims "or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to-individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litiga-
tion concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
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Lawyers used to wait with baited breath for the fine day they
would receive that big case, meaning a banana peel at Woolworth's.
But now the struggling attorney's new dream is that some dis-
gruntled little old lady, owning perhaps two shares of General
Motors, will present her fifty dollar dividend claim to him for
collection. With amended Rule 23, an attorney so lucky no longer
need struggle. He has arrived. Thanks to the liberalized class
action device, the little old malcontent's fifty dollar claim will be
magnified into a multi-million dollar looting operation.2
But ethically so? Perhaps the time has come for the courts to
question the propriety of certain widespread and growing practices
not heretofore challenged. The time may be ripe for the courts to
delineate certain outer limits beyond which the class device may
not properly be used. The purpose of this manuscript, then, is to
examine possible ethical objections to the class suit.
This manuscript raises two questions: (1) May a class action
ethically be maintained when there is a conflict of interests among
the members of the class such that the rights of counsel's principal
clients, his named plaintiffs, will be prejudiced by the inclusion
of the absent class members? and, (2) Does the maintenance of a
class action on a contingent fees basis constitute the stirring up of
litigation or the solicitation of clients?
1. MAY A CLASS ACTION ETHICALLY BE MAINTAINED WHEN
THERE IS A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE
CLASS SUCH THAT THE RIGHTS OF COUNSEL'S PRINCIPAL CLIENTS,
HIS NAMED PLAINTIFFS, WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THE INCLUSION
OF THE ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS?
Lord Brougham is credited with having remarked:
There are many whom it may be needful to remind that an
advocate-by the sacred duty of his connection with his client-
knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
2 See, e.g., Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hohman
v. Packard Instrument, 43 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
RULE 23
-that client and none other. To serve that client by all expedient
means, to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others
(even the party already injured), and, amongst others, to himself
is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties. And he must
not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction,
which he may bring upon any others. Nay, separating even the
duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, he must go on, reck-
less of the consequences, if his fate should unhappily be to involve
his country in confusion for his client.
3
When that one stockholder walks into her attorney's office
with her fifty dollar cause of action, and her att6rney accepts that
case, that attorney's first duty of loyalty is to that client and none
other. Even if the defendant corporation is undergoing a Chapter
X Bankruptcy reorganization,4 which usually is the case with a
1Ob-5 security fraud' class suit, there is an excellent possibility that
this one client's claim may be settled out of court. Perhaps one of
the twenty or more members of the board of directors will be
willing to pay the full fifty dollar claim just to avoid litigation. But
by transforming the case into a multi-million dollar suit, plaintiff's
counsel virtually ensures protracted litigation. By choosing the class
device for reasons that have little to do with the welfare of the
original client, counsel throws his client into the courtroom. In the
typical class suit, it is doubtful if there are enough assets that a
judgment for the full ad damnum will ever be satisfied, not even
out of the combined assets of all the directors. If a class judgment is
rendered against one or more of the defendants, it is likely that all
the members of the class will have to take a fractional share in the
proceeds. Counsel can spare his client this reduction merely by
filing an individual suit.
On that fateful day when the original plaintiff walked into
her attorney's office there existed an excellent opportunity for that
attorney to assist his client in obtaining a full recovery. Why, then,
would any attorney ever choose another alternative? Perhaps the
enthralling prospect of homing in on a large contingent fee is
sufficient temptation for some lawyers to abandon forever the
3 G. Keeton, Harris's Hints on Advocacy 208-09 (18th ed. 1943) (emphasis added).
But see ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 15.
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(b).
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opportunities their clients once had to recover substantial fractions
of their claims.
According to the Canons of Professional Ethics:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
.. forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employ-
ment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.6
Observe, however, that this objection to class actions is ap-
plicable only where there is a true conflict of interests among mem-
bers of the class, such as insufficient assets to satisfy all claimants.
7
In citizen suits, taxpayer actions, and even in securities cases in-
volving only voting or dividend rights in a solvent corporation,
there would seem to be no conflict of interests such that the original
client would be prejudiced by the inclusion of others in his suit.
One court has observed:
[T]he taxpayer suit device would lose its utility if we held that
a single taxpayer could not provide representation for his fellow
taxpayers. Without the searching and determined scrutiny of
gadfly taxpayers, often solitary in their pursuit of justice, many
excesses of governmental administration might escape unnoticed.8
But where there is a conflict of interests, "[i]t is unprofessional
to represent conflicting interests ...."9
2. DOES THE MAINTENANCE OF A CLASS ACTION ON A CON-
TINGENT FEE BASIS CONSTITUTE THE STIRRING UP OF LITIGATION OR
THE SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS?
According to the Canons of Professional Ethics:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is
not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action
and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect
judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims
for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action
in order to secure them as clients .... 10
6 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 6.
7 Concerning conflicts of interest, see generally Hansberry v. Lee, 711 U.S. 32 (1940).
8 Booth v. General Dynamics, 264 F. Supp. 465, 471 (N.D. 111. 1967); accord, Cypress
v. Newport News Gen'l Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
9 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 6.
10 Id. No. 28; cf. Id. No. 27.
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In a taxpayer or citizen suit, counsel may of course become
the self-appointed gladiator for absentees. But there he usually does
so without obtaining additional remuneration. In the typical cit-
izen suit, counsel is paid a fee certain by his principal client regard-
less of whether the pleadings are framed to extend the benefits of
any judgment to the class as well as to the client." The class bene-
ficiaries pay nothing.
But in the typical securities fraud case, one attorney fortu-
itous enough to have been contacted by one stockholder with one
fifty dollar claim is in a position to appoint himself contingent
counsel to thousands of persons, many of whom are unaware that
they even have a possible claim.
There can be no doubt that in the United States today the
securities fraud variety of class suit, spurred by the amendment to
Rule 23, is in danger of becoming just such a device whereby at-
torneys may stir up or enlarge litigation, may solicit clients, may
become their own clients, and may represent persons for a fee with-
out their advance knowledge or express consent.
In one recent case, the Pennsylvania federal court, fearful of
such ethical ramifications, was unwilling even to delegate to plain-
tiffs' counsel the "ministerial" task of transmitting notices of the
class action to the members of the class.' 2 And the reasoning of that
opinion is singularly eloquent.
In another recent case, the District Court for the Northern
District of California granted an order "[t]hat pending notification
of the class as hereinafter specified, neither plaintiffs or their coun-
sel, nor defendants or their counsel, shall solicit or otherwise con-
tact the class independently and in the absence of court approval."
13
As early as 1955, Judge Dimock of the Southern District of
New York said:
It may be argued that the rights of hundreds of servicemen
may be lost if plaintiffs cannot afford to adequately resist the
11 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Cypress v. Newport News Gen'l
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
12 School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row. Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001,
1004-05 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
13 Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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appeal and cannot ascertain the names of others who might con-
tribute to the cost. It may also be argued that the rights of
hundreds of servicemen may become bound by the Statute of
Limitations unless plaintiffs can obtain their names so as to warn
them. The natural answer to those arguments would be that these
plaintiffs are not their brothers' keepers. Can they constitute them-
selves their brothers' keepers by bringing an action on their behalf?
Only on such a theory could one support the right here asserted.
. . . The possibility of abuse of the right is so extensive as
to argue against the very existence of the right. 14
On the other hand, not all federal courts have taken such a
dim view of representative actions. 5 In one class action arising
under the Sherman Act, Judge Evans- said:
Nor is the financial aspect to be overlooked-that is, the plaintiffs'
and defendants' relative financial ability. The relative financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation is such, that greater parity
of ability is obtained by a joinder of plaintiffs.
To permit the defendants to contest liability with each
claimant in a single suit, would, in many cases, give defendants
an advantage which would be almost equivalent to closing the door
of justice to all small claimants. This is what we think the class
suit practice was to prevent. Like many another practice, necessity
was its mother. Its correct limitations must be ascertained by the
experiences which brought it into existence.' 6
The Seventh Circuit did not tell us exactly where these "cor-
rect limitations" lie. But the Second Circuit, also taking a favor-
able view of class actions, writes of Rule 23:
In our complex modern economic system where a single harm-
ful act may result in damages to a great many people there is
a particular need for the representative action as a device for
vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to
justify legal action but which are of sufficient size if taken as a
group. In a situation where we depend on individual initiative,
particularly the initiative of lawyers, for the assertion of rights,
there must be a practical method for combining these small claims,
and the representative action provides that method. 17
But while the representative device itself generally is held to
be desirable, the trial courts have been given a broad measure of
14 Hormel v. United States, 17 F.R.D. 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
15 This may vary from court to court. "The amended rule 23 has greatly increased the
authority of the trial judge in controlling the nature and course of the action." Comment,
Spurious Class Actions Based Upon Securities Frauds Under the Revised Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 35 Fordham L. Rev. 295, 311 (1966); accord, Cohn, The New Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1214 (1966).
16 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
17 Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis added);
see Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820
(1952).
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discretion in determining whether that device should be applied in
any particular case. 18 For example, in the classic case of Bairn &
Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., Judge Dawson of the Southern
District of New York disallowed a Sherman Act class action, saying
that "[t]he permissive use of class action permitted by Rule 23 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure was never intended as a device to
enable client solicitation, nor should it be permitted to be used for
that purpose."19 The notes of the Advisory Committee that drafted
new Rule 23 accord with this view. °
In the leading case of Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Cor-
poration,21 the principal plaintiff, an Alabama lawyer who evi-
dently had styled himself a "private, albeit reluctant, Attorney
General, '22 together with two members of his family, filed a securi-
ties fraud class suit, pro se as to the principal plaintiff, on behalf
of themselves and all other stockholders similarly situated. Ruling
on this situation, Judge Wyzanski of the Massachusetts federal
court said:
No precedent supports the suggestion that the plaintiffs or their
counsel have a moral duty to act as unsolicited champions of
others. Without going so far as to agree with defendants' argu-
ments that the proposed conduct of the plaintiffs or their counsel
would be champertous, or would violate either Canon 27 or
Canon 28 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics, this Court concludes that at the present stage of the contro-
versy (when there is no more reason to accept as true plaintiffs'
declaration than defendants' answers,) Rule 23 should not be
used "as a device to enable client solicitation." 23
Later, the Court approved a compromise in the case,24 and
awarded the stockholder-cum-law-license and his associates a con-
tingent fee of $200,000 for having so ably represented themselves
and their class. 5
18 Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 A.B.A. Antitrust L.J.
295, 301 (1966); Note, Class Actions-Federal Rule 23 Amended, 31 Albany L. Rev. 127,
130 (1967); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 Va. L. Rev. 629, 642
(1965); cf. Mr. Justice Black's Statement, 39 F.R.D. 69, 274 (1966) (dissent).
19 Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
20 Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
21 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) (ethics of
class action); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963)
(compromise approved); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass.
1963) ($200,000 contingent fee approved).
22 201 F. Supp. 934, 936.
23 Ibid.
24 221 F. Supp. 48.
25 Id. at 55, 61.
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In non-representative suits it has long been held that contin-
gent fee contracts contemplate arm's length bargaining.26 Where
an attorney volunteers his services in an easy case, the contingency
contract is deemed to have been procured by fraud.27 Counsel may
not solicit a contingent fee contract.28 But even the common ambu-
lance chaser 29 has at least the written consent of all his clients,
which is more than can be said of the securities fraud attorney.
Is there any logical basis for the tacit distinction between the
vilified ambulance chaser, on the one hand, and the much more
respectable corporate looter, on the other? If so, the time has come
for the bench and the bar to codify the reasoning behind this
distinction. If they are unable to do so, it is a distinction without a
difference and ought to be discarded.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the time is ripe to strike some balance between
the highly useful class device and the highly questionable conse-
quences that often follow when that device is used in cases involv-
ing shortages of money. It Should be apparent that class actions
should not be allowed in such cases, where there invariably exists
a conflict of interests between the named plaintiff and the class.30
Absent any such conflict of interests (as, for example, where
only rights are involved, or where the defendants have ample re-
sources to satisfy any prospective judgment), the courts should
permit the action to proceed if it also complies with the terms of the
Rule itself. Still, the courts should carefully examine the fee basis.
There can be little objection if the contract is for a fee certain.
If plaintiffs' counsel are motivated to represent the absentees solely
by a spirit of altruism, there can be no complaint on any ground
other than conflict of interests.
26 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Webster's Ex'r, 284 Ky. 564, 145 S.V.2d 82 (1940).
27 See, e.g., Henry v. Vance, III Ky. 72, 63 S.XV. 273, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 491 (1901).
28 See, e.g., Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273 (1927); In-
gersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178, 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 282, 119 Am. St.
R. 1003, 10 Ann. Cas. 829 (1906)
29 "In New York City there is a style of lawyers known to the profession as 'ambulance
chasers' because they are on hand wherever there is a railway wreck or a street car collision
or a gasoline explosion . . . with their offers of professional service." 1897 Cong. Rec,
July 24, 1961. This is the first use of the phrase, according to Matthews, Dictionary of
Americanisms (1951). Should we add "corporate bankruptcy" to the above list?
30 Concerning conflicts of interest, see generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
